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Abstract 
Based on the concept and evaluation methods of safety-related systems and safety integrity levels specified in the relevant 
international standards, this paper is described  Estimating Technology of Safety Integrity Level of high-speed train in 
detail. Additionally, select a critical electrical system of high-speed train as the analysis object, and then identification and 
calculation of its SIL grade. This paper provides a basis for SIL level evaluation of High-speed Train. 
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1. Introduction 
With the rapid development of high-speed rail transport, high-speed train tend to be multi-functional, 
integrated, complex, and many conflicts unavoidably occur between system complexity and high security. But 
once the safety accident happens, it will cause serious social and economic consequences. How to ensure the 
security of high-speed train is face many new challenges inevitably. Therefore, the assessment of safety 
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integrity level for high-speed trains' safety-related systems, which is great significance for reducing the 
frequency of the accident, protecting of personal  safety, and keeping it safe and stable operation in the long 
period. This article briefly describes the international standardization IEC61508 relating to concepts and 
principles of safety integrity levels, and focuses on the assessment of safety integrity level, then apply it in the 
high-speed train. 
2. Safety Integrity Level 
2.1. Safety Integrity Level(SIL) 
SIL is a qualitative representation of discrete safety integrity, which is related to required safety function 
failure probability. The higher its requirements, the higher cost will be taken. Because of train safety 
performance and safety integrity is affected by its operating environment, we should specify product use 
environment and constraints before using the product in the system. 
2.2. Division of SIL 
According to the failure frequency of the train products security features, SIL can be divided into four 
levels.  Level 4 has the highest safety integrity requirements, while Level 1 has the lowest safety integrity 
requirements. Different safety integrity levels request different technical requirements for train products. The 
higher the security features of SIL, the more complex requirements of technical conditions, its cost is also 
higher. On the contrary, if the security features of SIL are too low, the security level of the train products 
would not meet the safety requirements. 
Working model is the intended use of safety-related systems. It is related with the required frequency, for 
the following two modes:  
 Low-need modes: the frequency of safety-related systems needed to operate not more than 1 per year, and 
not more than two times of test frequency that confirmed. 
 High-need or continuous mode: the frequency of safety-related systems needed to operate more than 1 per 
year or more than the confirmed test frequency 2 times. 
IEC 61508 divides the SIL based on the operating mode different, as shown in Table 1 and Table 2. 
Table 1. SIL in the low-need modes 
SIL probability requirements of average requirements 
4  10-5and 10-4 
3  10-4 and 10-3 
2  10-3 and 10-2 
1 10-2 and 10-1 
Table 2. SIL in the High-need or continuous mode 
SIL probability requirements of average requirements 
4  10-9 and 10-8 
3  10-8 and 10-7 
2  10-7 and 10-6 
1 10-6 and 10-5 
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3. Determination of SIL 
3.1. Qualitative methods to determine SIL 
Qualitative approach is relatively simple and required data is less, it relies heavily on engineering practice 
and the personnel professional and technical of engineering staff. Qualitative methods are mainly the 
consequences method, risk matrix method, risk maps method and so on. 
The risk map method is the most widely used qualitative methods. The method is based on four parameters, 
including: C is the consequences of risk parameters, F is exposure time or frequency parameter, P is the 
probability of dangerous cannot avoid, W is probability of undesirable event. Through the combination of 
four parameters, we could determine the risk reduction requirements, and obtain the SIL of appropriate safety-
related system. Fig. 1 shows an example of the risk map method. 
starting point of  risk 
reducing estim
ate
 
Fig. 1. Typical risk map 
3.2. Semi-quantitative method to determine SIL 
On the basis of the qualitative analysis, the semi-quantitative method is joining in the quantitative 
probability analysis of the effectiveness of security features on the basis of the qualitative analysis, so that 
analysis results have higher confidence. Semi-quantitative method provides a path which can track the 
accident development through the event tree analysis (ETA), get the security features PFDavg through 
probability analysis, and determine the appropriate SIL According to safety integrity table.  
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is generally recommended method of semi-quantitative analysis. 
when we use the LOPA method, we should first define: the occurrence frequency of hazardous event which is 
as a risk cause fex(ex(x=1,2,3, ,n) On behalf of the hazardous event); IPLxy(y=1,2,3, ,m)( does not include 
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the E / E / PE safety-related systems), which is the independent protection layer of ex, its average requirements 
of probability of failure is PFDxy; Risk the consequences of C, and so on.  
According to the consequences of the risk and the relevant standards, regulations and social demands, 
determine the risk allow frequency ft. calculate the system original risk frequency before the implementation 
of security protection function
1 1
( )
x
mn
i e xy
x y
f f PFD . According to the standard, we can obtain the 
probability requirements of average requirements PFDavg is: 
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 LOPA analysis is shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. LOPA analysis Example 
4. Case Study 
Gas relay is a key component of Traction transformer, its function is to prevent combustible gas, which is 
ionized form transformer oil, explosion. When the concentration of the combustible gas reaches to a certain 
degree, it will trigger the gas relay protection work, and then cut off the VCB main circuit breaker. If the Gas 
relay has a fault, the potential safety hazards may occur in the traction transformer system even vehicle. 
Therefore, it is necessary to assess the safety integrity of its electrical system 
Next, we will determine the SIL of this safety-related systems use the risk map method (qualitative 
assessment) and the LOPA (semi-quantitative assessment) respectively. 
4.1. determine the SIL using risk map method 
Table 3 shows the classification of typical consequences, Table 4 is classification of typical time in the 
hazardous area, Table 5 is classification of typical avoid dangerous probability, Table 6 is a typical request 
rate classification. 
Table 3.  The classification of typical consequences 
Severity classification Description 
CA lesser harm 
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CB serious and lasting harm 
CC a small number of casualties 
CD large number of casualties 
Table 4. Classification of typical time in the hazardous area 
Classification Description 
FA the time in the area of unintended effects is less than 
10% of the total time 
FB frequent or persistent in the area of unintended effects 
Table 5. Classification of typical avoid dangerous probability 
Classification Description 
PA if the following conditions are true select the PA, or 
choose the PB: 
1. if the safety system failure, the operator will get a 
warning 
2. it have the protection devices that Independent of 
the security system, and people can escape from the 
danger zone 
3. the warning operator get one hour more than the 
risk of events occurred, or have a clear long enough 
time to take action 
PB 
Table 6. Classification of typical request rate  
Classification Description 
W1 less than 0.03 times / year 
W2 0.03-0.3 times / year 
W3 0.3-3 times / year 
According to the existing fault record and experience, we can qualitatively determine the selection of 
results for each parameter. In the event of flammable gas concentration which ionization from the transformer 
oil excess the standard, Results of each parameter determine that cause of gas relay protection function fails is 
as follows  
 The consequences is CD, that may lead to large number of casualties; 
 In the frequency of the danger zone FA, rarely in the area of unintended effects, the time in the area of 
unintended effects is less than 10% of the total time; 
 Probability of avoid the dangerous is PB, or almost impossible; 
 Select the highest value of require rate W3  
Therefore, we can get the device Risk maps as shown in Fig. 1, and the security system should meet the 
SIL4. 
4.2. Determine the SIL using LOPA 
According to relevant standards and requirements, we set the probability of explosion cause by transformer 
oil ionizing flammable gases must be less than 10-7 times / year. let the probability of gas relay protection 
failure is X, the ionization probability of flammable gases in transformer oil is 1 time/ year, the probability of 
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accident is 0.7,  the probability of  the main circuit breaker failure is 0.01. Create an event tree as shown in Fig. 
3. 
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Fig.3. an event tree of gas relay protection 
If there is no gas relay protection, accident probability is 0.007. Calculate the security features PFDavg 
use LOPA is: 
-7
-5
-3
10 =1.4 10
7 10
t
avg
i
fPFD
f
 
Therefore, access to the low-need of Safety Integrity Level Safety Integrity Level table as shown in Table 1, 
we can determine the security features required is SIL4. 
5. Conclusion 
High-speed trains as an efficient means of transport, play an increasingly important role in the field of 
transportation. In the design of high-speed trains, we should take appropriate measures according to product 
required SIL, in order to reduce the risk of products under the allowed risk, making it as the socially 
acceptable products. However, assessment of SIL on high-speed train's safety-related systems has just begun 
at the present stage. It requires the professional and technical personnel make efforts to carry out safety 
assessments of the high-speed train's safety-related systems, and to provide a more secure protection for the 
safe operation of high-speed trains. 
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